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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

GEORGE K. BRADFORD,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

::

vs.

:

ANDREA 0. BRADFORD and
JAMES A. DEMIT A

:
:

Case No. 981745-CA

Defendants/Appellants.
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this
matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2) (1)
(1996) .
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.

When deciding to partition property in a divorce action,

did the trial Court misapply the law when it found that
appellee husband was the creditor of appellant wife?
The standard of review for the trial court's
interpretation of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act is
correction of error.
(Utah App. 1991) .

State

v. Morck,

821 P.2d 1190, 1192

However, the standard of review for the

trial court's finding of fact in this area is whether the
trial court committed a clear and prejudicial abuse of

discretion.

Rasband v. Rasband,

752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah

1988) .
II.

After entering a decree of divorce, did the trial court

abuse its broad powers of discretion when it apportioned the
marital property between the two parties?
The standard of review on this issue is the abovementioned Rasband standard.
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Please see the attached addendum "A" - The Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act, Utah Code Ann. §25-6-5 (1988).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellee ("'Mr. Bradford") tried this action in the
Fourth District Court, Honorable Steven L. Hansen presiding,
on a complaint for divorce and a claim that appellant ("Mrs.
Bradford") had fraudulently conveyed her portion of the
marital home.

Findings of Fact and a Decree of Divorce were

filed on July 14, 1998. Appellant's Timely Motion to Alter
and Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree
were denied on September 4, 1998. Appellant then filed a
timely appeal to which appellee now responds.

2

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1.

Mr. and Mrs. Bradford were married in June 1985, in

Provo, Utah (Findings of Fact No. 1, p.152, Record) (3/4/98
Tr. At 37) .
2.

During the three months before the commencement of

their divorce proceedings, Mr. and Mrs. Bradford were legal
residents of Utah Country, Utah (Findings of Fact No. 2, p.
152, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 47).
3.

Effective July 14, 1998, the lower court found that

the existence of irreconcilable differences between Mr. and
Mrs. Bradford made the continuation of their marriage no
longer possible (Findings of Fact No. 3, p. 152, Record).
4.

Prior to their marriage, Mr, and Mrs. Bradford had

each been married once. Although no children were born of
their marriage, each party has at least one adult child from
their previous marriages (Findings of Fact Nos. 4 & 5, p.
152, Record).
5.

Mr. and Mrs. Bradford are 63 and 65 years old,

respectively (Findings of Fact, No. 6, p. 151, Record)
(3/4/98 Tr. at 89) .
6.

While they were married, Mrs. Bradford possessed few
3

assets other than some personal property and land in
Indianola, Utah. After paying the debt on this land with
money given to her by her husband, Mrs. Bradford eventually
sold this land.

She kept all of the profits herself

(Findings of Fact No. 7, p. 151, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 3-4).
7a.

Before they were married, Mr. Bradford worked at

Geneva Steel where he received special on-the-job training.
He was also, and still is, a janitor with the Nebo School
District (Findings of Fact No. 8, page 151, Record) (3/4/98
Tr. at 37, 39).
7b. When the divorce was granted, Mr. Bradford's monthly
assets were thus: $410 from the Nebo School District, $769
from Social Security, $324 from his pension, and $50 from
rent from his property.

Said figures total $1,553.

However, because Mr. Bradford puts $105 per month into a
discretionary retirement account, his monthly income is
actually $1,658.

(Findings of Fact No. 9, page 151, Record)

(3/4/98 Tr. at 80-83).
8.

During the marriage, Mrs. Bradford worked at

temporary jobs.

Because she has trouble focusing on her

task and may have carpal tunnel syndrome, she is unable to
work (Findings of Fact No. 10, page 151, Record) (3/4/98 Tr.
4

at 90-92) .
9.

Mrs. Bradford receives approximately $150 per month

in child care for taking care of her granddaughter and $381
in Social Security, which amounts to $531 in monthly income.
(Findings of Fact No 11, p. 151, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 93).
10.

Neither Mr. nor Mrs. Bradford can be retained or

develop new skills in order to substantially increase their
income.

(Findings of Fact No. 12, p. 151, Record).

11.

Mr. and Mrs. Bradford have lived in Mr. Bradford's

home in Spanish Fork, Utah, since the beginning of their
marriage.

This home was paid for and then given to Mr.

Bradford as an inheritance gift before he married Mrs.
Bradford.

Mr. Bradford was born and raised in this house,

and it has been passed from generation to generation within
his family.

(Findings of Fact No. 13, p. 151, Record)

(3/4/98 Tr. At 34-35).
12.

Since the parties have been married, various

improvements have been made to the home.

This work includes

a repaired roof and septic system, the addition of a new
furnace, and plumbing work that connected the home to city
water.

Findings of Fact No. 14, p. 150, Record) (3/4/98 Tr.

at 18-23) .
5

13.

Although Mrs. Bradford claims that she was an

integral part of the home improvements, she actually made
only phone calls and arrangements for the work to be done.
(Findings of Fact No. 15, p. 150, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 1823) .
14.

The repairs and improvements made to the home were

paid for by funds which Mr. Bradford received from a
settlement with Geneva Steel.
before the marriage.

This money was acquired

(Findings of Fact No. 16, p. 150,

Record) . (3/4/98 Tr. at 48) .
15.

Neither party disputes that the value of the home

is $180,000.
16.

(Findings of Fact No. 17, p. 150, Record).

Mr. Bradford deeded the home by way of warranty

deed to he and Mrs. Bradford as "joint tenants with full
rights of survivorship and not as tenants in common"
approximately four years after they had married. (Findings
of Fact No. 18, p.150, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 44).
17.

Mr. Bradford filed for divorce from Mrs. Bradford

in 1992. At that time, Mr. Bradford requested that both the
home and other real property be awarded to him.

The divorce

action was dismissed in 1993. (Findings of Fact No. 19, p.
150, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 55) .
6

18.

Since 1992, Mr. and Mrs. Bradford have had many

arguments, and Mr. Bradford has threatened to divorce Mrs.
Bradford on many occasions.

(Findings of Fact No. 20, p.

150, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 55) .
19.

James DeMita, Mrs. Bradford's adult son, has been

living with Mr. and Mrs. Bradford since 1995. Mr. Demitafs
son also stays at the home from time to time.

In exchange

for these living arrangements, Mr. Demita neither pays rent
nor the utility bill and resides in the home rent-free.
(Findings of Fact No. 21, p. 150, Record).
20.

Mr. Demita attended one year of law school and has

since worked at various jobs.

At the time of the trial, Mr.

Demita was employed on a part-time basis at a computer
store.

His 1996 gross income was approximately $3,500

(Findings of Fact No. 22, p. 150, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at
106-08).
21.

In 1996, all three parties began work together to

develop the land for re-zoning, division into lots and sale.
They hired LSI, Inc. to survey the ground, prepare a
subdivision plat and perform other pre-sales work.

In

exchange for his assistance with this project, Mr. Demita
was to receive 25% of the profits from the sale. (Findings
7

of Fact No. 23, p. 149, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 42-43; 6176) .
22.

In July 1996, Mr. Bradford discovered various

engineers in his home when he entered his house.

Although

the reasons for the ensuing argument with Mrs. Bradford are
in dispute, Mr. Bradford was upset with the project's
development.

This argument was more severe than the others,

and divorce was again discussed.

(Findings of Fact No. 24,

p. 149, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 38-40) .
23.

On August 8, 1996, Mrs. Bradford deeded her share

of the home by way of quit claim deed to her son James
Demita.

Mr. Demita gave his mother $10 for the transaction.

(Findings of Fact No. 25, p. 149, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 410) .
24.

$10 is not the equivalent value of one-half of the

house and property.

(Findings of Fact No. 26, p. 149,

Record).
25.

Because Mr. Demita is Mrs. Bradford's son, the

quit-claim transfer of her property to his name was made to
an "insider," according to Utah Law. (Findings of Fact No.
27, p. 149, Record).
26.

Although she deeded her portion of the property to
8

Mr. Demita rather than any of her other children, Mrs.
Bradford claimed that the transfer was made for estate
planning purposes. At trial, however, she acknowledged that
she did not prepare a will nor did she prepare any
instructions whatsoever regarding the disposition of the
property.

(Findings of Fact No. 28, p. 149, Record) (3/4/98

Tr. at 10-14).
27.

After this transfer, Mrs. Bradford and Mr. Demita

continued to live in the home as they had before.

(Findings

of Fact No. 29, p. 149, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 12-14).
28.

Neither Mrs. Bradford nor Mr. Demita ever told Mr.

Bradford about the quit-claim transfer.

Mr. Bradford

discovered the existence of the deed when his daughter went
to the recorder's office to verify that the home and
property has been re-zoned for development as Mr. Demita had
mentioned.

At this time, the daughter discovered the Quit-

Claim Deed and that the property had actually never been rezoned.

(Findings of Fact No. 30, p. 148-49, Record) (3/4/98

Tr. at 14, 42, 45).
29.

After discovering this information, Mr. Bradford

commenced another divorce action against his wife.

The time

between the granting of the deed and the filing of divorce
9

was approximately 11 months.

(Findings of Fact No. 31, p.

148, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 46).
30.

The transfer of Mrs. Bradford's portion of the home

to her son left her in possession of only her personal
property, which has limited value.

Thus, this transfer

constituted substantially all of her assets.

(Findings of

Fact No. 32, p. 148, Record).
31.

When asked on cross-examination whether she could

afford to pay Mr. Bradford for one-half of the property's
value, Mrs. Bradford indicated that she would not be able to
do so, but that she would have to rely on family members if
she were obligated to pay such a sum.

(Findings of Fact No.

33, p. 148, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 101-02).
32.

At the time of the transfer of the Quit-Claim Deed,

Mrs. Bradford should have reasonably believed that Mr.
Bradford might seek to divorce her, and that he would
probably claim the home and property as his own as he had
done so in the previous 1992 divorce action.

(Findings of

Fact No. 34, p. 148, Record).
33.

The house and property are not partitionable, as

they contain a residence, road, and river frontage.
interest were conveyed, the house would have to be
10

If an

refinanced or sold.

(Findings of Fact No. 35, p. 148,

Record).
34.

Even though Mr. Bradford placed Mrs. Bradford's

name on the deed to the house in 1992, the trial court found
that the house and property belong to Mr. Bradford since he
inherited this from his father before he married Mrs.
Bradford.

This finding is consistent with previous Utah

Supreme Court decisions wherein the parties married later in
life, and one of the parties had brought into the marriage
an inheritance gift which was subsequently deeded to the
other party.

See Georgedes

1981); Jesperson

v. Georgedes,

v. Jesperson,

627 P.2d 44 (Utah

610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980).

(Findings of Fact No. 36, p. 148, Record).
35.

Mr. Bradford earns $1,926 per month, but his net

income is approximately $1,658.

His monthly expenses are

$1,000 per month without rent or a mortgage payment.
expenses are reasonable and necessary.

These

(Findings of Fact

No. 37, p. 147-48, Record).
36..

Mr. Bradford has approximately $600 per month

after necessary expenses. Mr. Bradford also has at his
disposal the house and property which do not have a mortgage
and are worth approximately $180,000.
11

(Findings of Fact No.

38, p. 147, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 80-83).
37.

Mrs. Bradford nets $531 per month.

She listed her

expenses at $1750 which includes $600 for rent (which she is
currently not paying).

This leaves Mrs. Bradford with a

shortfall of approximately 1,200 per month.

However, she is

65 years old, not trained in an employable skill, and has
health concerns.

She receives $150 per month for caring for

one of her grandchildren.

Although she may be able to earn

more from child care, there is insufficient evidence that
she would be able to find such a position, or that even if
she were to increase her child care hours that it would meet
her shortfall. Mrs. Bradford has a need for alimony.
(Findings of Fact No. 39, p. 147, Record).
38.

Mrs. Bradford has expenses which exceed her income,

but she cannot make up for this shortfall. Mr. Bradford has
approximately $600 per month after expenses.

Therefore, Mr.

Bradford is required to pay Mrs. Bradford $600 per month in
alimony for a term not to exceed the length of the marriage.
This gives $1,131.00 to Mrs. Bradford to meet her expenses
and leaves 1,058.00 for Mr. Bradford's expenses.

(Findings

of Fact No. 40, p. 147, Record).
39.

Mr. and Mrs. Bradford acquired the following
12

investments during their marriage:
First Security Bank Accounts

$6,492

Valic IRA

$2,418

Utah Retirement

$1,583

Insurance Policy Cash Value

$3,990

(Findings of Fact No. 41, p. 147, Record).
40.

Each party is awarded one-half of the total sum

from the above investments.

The remainder of the personal

property has been divided between the parties and the same
should be awarded as divided.

(Findings of Fact No. 42, p.

146, Record).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In this response brief, Mr. Bradford will rebut each of
Mrs. Bradford's arguments.
as follows:

Her arguments can be summarized

1) Mrs. Bradford did not fraudulently convey

the home in question; 2) Mr. Bradford was not her
"creditor;" 3) The portion of the home that she allegedly
owned was "gifted" to her by her former husband; and 4) The
lower court abused its broad powers of discretion when it
apportioned the property in its divorce decree.
In rebuttal, Mr. Bradford will show that his ex-wife
fraudulently conveyed her portion of the marital home to her
13

son in violation of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.
this end, Mr. Bradford will show that he was

To

a

"creditor" of Mrs. Bradford.
Mr. Bradford will also show that the home was not a
legal gift, as Mrs. Bradford claims.

Lastly, Mr. Bradford

will explain why the lower court did not abuse its broad
powers of discretion when it decided to apportion the
marital property.

To this end, Mr. Bradford will ask this

Court to affirm the lower court's decision on all counts.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:
A.

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE

Mrs. Bradford Violated the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act.

The first issue to be resolved is whether Mrs. Bradford
violated the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act,

UTAH CODE ANN.

sec. 25-6-5 (1988) (hereinafter "the Act") (See Attached
Addendum) .x
Many jurisdictions have adopted the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act, recognizing that "[t]he law has long held that
transfers of property designed to place a debtor's assets
beyond the reach of the debtor's creditors are void as to
the creditors." Indeed, the Act has a rich history in the
common law. See, e.g., 13 Elizabeth 1 (1570) Ch. Twyne's
Case, 3 Coke 80, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (1601); Clements v. Moore,
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 299, 312, 18 L.Ed. 786 (1867); Smith v.
Holland,
298 Ky. 598, 603-604, 183 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Ky. Ct.
14

Mrs. Bradford's conduct falls squarely within the
language of the Act. Mr. Bradford was a creditor with a
claim before the conveyance, and Mrs. Bradford, acting with
actual intent, sought to hinder, delay, or defraud him.2
Specifically, Mrs. Bradford's conduct aligns itself with at
least

7 of the 11 indicators of "actual intent" as found in

25-6-5(2):
subsection

"a" - The conveyance was made to an insider.3

yy
subsection
b" - Both Mrs. Bradford and her adult son, James
Demita, along with Mr. Bradford, possessed and were in
control of the home after the transfer. Indeed, Mrs.
Bradford and Mr. Demita continued to live in the home.

subsection
"c" - Neither Mrs. Bradford nor Mr. Demita
informed Mr. Bradford about the transfer.
subsection
M " - The transfer was made only a month before
she was sued for an action in divorce.
subsection
"e" - The transfer, valued at approximately
$90,000, consisted of virtually all of Mrs. Bradford's
assets (her assets were found by the trial court to amount
to about $5, 000) .

App. 1944); Ranier

National

Bank v. McCracken,

26 Wash Appl.

498, 505-506, 615 P.2d 469, 474 (1980).
2

For a more detailed discussion regarding Mr.
Bradford's status as Mrs. Bradford's creditor, see Infra
16.
3

The Act states that an insider can include "a
relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the
debtor. . ." Id., sec. 25-6-2(7)(a)(i).
15

p.

subsection
"1" - Mrs. Bradford became insolvent after she
transferred the home.
subsection
"j" - Mrs. Bradford transferred the home shortly
before the action in divorce was to leave her in debt.
B. Mr. Bradford was Mrs. Bradford's Creditor within
the Language of the Act.
The crux of Mrs. Bradford's argument regarding
fraudulent conveyances, hinges upon her belief that Mr.
Bradford was not her creditor.
First, it should be noted that the plain language of the
Act proves otherwise. A creditor is "a person who has a
claim," and a "[c]laim means a right to payment, whether or
not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated,
unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured,
disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable,
unsecured."

Id.,

secured, or

at 25-6-2 (3)- (4) (emphasis added).

At the

time of the conveyance, and in the years before, Mr.
Bradford had threatened Mrs. Bradford with a suit in divorce
many times.

In July 1996, the parties had a particularly

severe argument, and the topic was again discussed.

Only

one month later, on August 8, 1996, Mrs. Bradford conveyed
the property in question.4
4

Even if Mrs. Bradford acted without actual intent,
her actions also comport with the "alternative language" of
16

Second, it should be noted that many courts have
recognized a spouse as a "creditor" for purposes of a
fraudulent conveyance action. Although Mr. Bradford has
found no Utah cases directly on point, the Supreme Court of
Oregon (citing an earlier decision) resolved this exact
issue in Adamson v. Adamson,

541 P.2d 460 (Or. 1975).

In Weber v. Rothchild,
15 Or. 385, 388-89, 15
P. 650, 2 Am.St.Rep. 162 (1887), we held that
a person in the position of plaintiff may
maintain a suit to set aside a transaction
which may defeat her recovery and rights in a
contemplated suit for divorce. See also Bosma
v. Harder, 94 Or. 219, 230-32, 185 P. 741
(1919); Burnett

et

al.

V. Hatch,

200 Or. 291,

266 P.2d 414 (1954). This rule prevails in
other jurisdictions that have considered the
matter. See Bigelow, The Law of Fraudulent
Conveyances 168, 173 (1911); Note. 14 Albany
L. Rev. 102, 103-04 (1950); Annot., 49
A.L.R.2d 521 sec. 10 at 556-58 (1956); 37 Am.
Jur. 2d, Fraudulent Conveyances sec. 133
(1968).
We conclude, as did the trial court, that
the conveyance by deed of April 14, 1972, was
obtained by fraud to hinder or prevent
plaintiff's recovery of Brian's equitable
interest in the fourplex, in the divorce suit,
and is therefore set aside and held to be
void.
Adamson

at 4 66.

the Act — sec. 25-6-5(1) (b) (i-ii) . Specifically, the coappellant, James Demita, paid Mrs. Bradford $10 for half of
a home valued at approximately $180,000 (section (1)(b).
17

In short, Mr. Bradford was clearly a "creditor" within
the meaning of the Act, and this conclusion is supported by
ample case authority.
II.

DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY
The bulk of Mrs. Bradford's argument concerns the issue

of a fraudulent conveyance; however, Mrs. Bradford makes two
equity arguments, which will now be discussed together.
A.

Reverter of Home

Mrs. Bradford asserts that the trial court erroneously
reverted the home to Mr. Bradford as well as inequitably
distributed the marital property.
affects both issues is thus:

The overriding rule that

"In divorce proceedings, the

trial court has considerable discretion concerning property
distribution.

This court will not disturb the trial court's

decision unless it is clearly unjust or a clear abuse of
discretion[;]"

Walters

v. Walters,

App. 1991) (citing Paffel

812 P.2d 64, 66 (Utah

v. Paffel,

732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah

1986)) and the trial court's ". . . actions enjoy a
presumption of validity."

Schaumberg

v. Schaumberg,

Utah Adv. Rep. 11, 13 (Utah App. 1994) (citing Watson
Watson,

240
v.

837 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah App. 1992)).

As to the distribution of pre-marital property, the Utah
18

Court of Appeals has stated that M[a]s a general rule,
however, premarital property is viewed as separate property,
and equity usually requires that *each party retain the
separate property he or she brought into the marriage.'"
Walters

v.

denied,

836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992) ((quoting Haumont

Haumont,

Walters,

812 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah App. 1991),

cert

v.

793 P.2d 421, 424 Utah App. 1990)).

Continuing with the concept that a trial court is
afforded latitude when dividing marital property, the Utah
Supreme Court has stated:
Although the home was held in joint tenancy,
that is not conclusive that a gift has been
made. . . The trial court found as follows:
Although the mobile home in issue is [was]
held in joint tenancy, there was no intention
by Plaintiff to create a one-half property
interest in Defendant, nor any expectation by
Defendant that he had received a one-half
property interest.
Jesperson
Jesperson,

v. Jesperson,

610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980) .5 In

the parties were married for approximately six

years; they were both older individuals (the husband was 73,
5

Mrs. Bradford also asserts that Mr. Bradford gave
her portion of the home to her as a gift. The findings of
fact and conclusions of law, however, prove otherwise. The
trial judge took into consideration Mr. Eiradford' s request
for reverter of Mrs. Bradford's interest when he filed for
divorce against her in 1992.
19

and the wife was 68); no children were born of the marriage;
and, lastly, although the home had been owned by the wife
before their marriage, and although she had deeded a joint
tenancy interest to her husband during their marriage, the
Court reverted the property to her.6
Jesperson

is very similar to the case at bar, in that

Mr. and Mrs. Bradford were married later in life, and they
had no children during their rather short marriage. Also,
Mr. Bradford was born and raised in the home, which had been
passed down in his family for many generations.

See

also

Cox v. Cox, 877 P.2d 1262, 1270 (Utah App. 1994) (affirming
a divorce decree between a husband and his second wife,
wherein the marital home was reverted to the husband who had
raised his nine children in it from a previous marriage but
had Quit Claimed half of the property to the wife a few days
before they were married.).
B.

Apportionment of the Marital Property, Generally

As to the argument that the marital property was

6

See

also

Georgedes

v.

Georgedes,

627 P.2d 44, 45

(Utah 1981) (trial court, after entering decree of divorce
for parties seeking to dissolve their second but short
marriage, did not abuse its powers of discretion when it
reverted pre-marital property to its original owners.).
20

inequitably divided, the overarching rule from Walters
applies:

still

"[tjhis court will not disturb the trial court's

decision [concerning property division] unless it is clearly
unjust or a clear abuse of discretion."
812 P.2d at 66; accord

Smith

v. Smith,

Walters

v.

Walters,

751 P.2d 1149, 1151

(Utah App. 1988).7
When dividing the marital property, the trial court
should consider:
the amount and kind of property to be divided,
the source of the property, the parties'
health, the parties standard of living and
respective financial conditions, their needs
and earning capacities, the duration of the
marriage, what the parties gave up by the
marriage, and the relationship the property
division has with the amount of alimony
awarded.
Id.,

at 1147-48.
When applying these rules to the case at bar, it should

7

See

also

Naranjo

v.

Naranjo,

751 P.2d 1144 (Utah

App. 1988),which states:
there is no fixed formula upon which to
determine a division of properties in a
divorce action[;] the trial court has
considerable latitude in adjusting financial
and property interests, and its actions are
entitled to a presumption of validity.
Id.

at 1146.
21

first be mentioned that if the court's decision regarding
the home is reversed, it will either need to be refinanced
or sold — all costly procedures. As mentioned above, the
home was inherited by Mr, Bradford and has been in his
family for generations. Also, the marriage was rather
short, neither party is in a state of health which renders
them unable to earn an income, and the assets used to
improve the home during the marriage came out of Mr.
Bradford's pocket.

To this end, this Court should find that

the lower court did not abuse its broad powers of discretion
when it reverted the home to Mr. Bradford and apportioned
the marital property as it saw fit.
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
In conclusion, Mr. Bradford submits that his points are
well taken and requests this Court to affirm the lower
court's decision in respect to all issues.
DATED this £ ^ day of May, 1999.
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN

THOMAS R. PATTON
Attorney for Appellee George Bradford
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I hereby certify that I mailed postage prepaid, two (2)
true and correct copies of the foregoing Response of
Appellee to Howard Chuntz, Esq., 1149 West Center Street,
Orem, UT 84057 this 2-~? day of May, 1999.
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CHAPTER 6
UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT
Section
25-6n
25-6-2
25-6>3*
25-6. 4 '
25-6^
25-6-£
25-6-7
25-6-^'
25-6-£'
25-6-10
25-6-ix
25-6 12.
25-6 13.

Short title.
Definitions.
Insolvency.
Value — Transfer.
Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising before or
after transfer.
Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising before
transfer.
Transfer — When made.
Remedies of creditors.
Good faith transfer.
Claim for relief — Time limits.
Legal principles applicable to chapter.
Construction of chapter.
Applicability of chapter.

25 6

- -.L Short title.
T"is chapter is known as the "Uniform Fraudulent Transfer

Act."

25-6-2. Definitions.
* n this chapter:
(1) "Affiliate" means:

1988

25-6-2

(a) a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 20% or more of the
outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other
t h a n a person who holds the securities:
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole discretionary power to vote the securities; or
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has
not exercised the power to vote;
(b) a corporation 20% or more of whose outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly owned,
controlled, or held with power to vote, by the debtor or
a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or
holds, with power to vote, 20% or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than a
person who holds the securities:
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole power
to vote the securities; or
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has
not exercised the power to vote;
(c) a person whose business is operated by the
debtor under a lease or other agreement, or a person
substantially all of whose assets are controlled by the
debtor; or
(d) a person who operates the debtor's business
under a lease or other agreement or controls substant i a ^ #// of the debtor's assets.
(2) "Asset" means property of a debtor, but does not
kiclude:
(a) property to the extent it is encumbered by a
valid lien;
(b) property to the extent it is generally exempt
under nonbankruptcy law; or
(c) an interest in property held in tenancy by the
entireties to the extent it is not subject to process by
a creditor holding a claim against only one tenant.
(3) "Claim" means a right to payment, whether or not
t h e right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed,
Undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.
(4) "Creditor" means a person who has a claim.
(5) "Debt" means liability on a claim.
(6) "Debtor"' means a person who is liable on a claim.
(7) "Insider" includes:
(a) if t h e debtor is an individual:
(i) a relative of the debtor or of a general
partner of the debtor;
(ii) a partnership in which the debtor is a
general partner;
(iii) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection (7)(a)(ii);
(iv> a corporation of which the debtor is a
directory officer, or person in control; or
(v) a limited liability company of which the
debtor is a member or manager;
(b) if the debtor is a corporation:
(i) a director of the debtor;
(ii) an officer of the debtor;
(iii) a person in control of the debtor;
(iv) a partnership in which the debtor is a
general partner;
(v) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection (7)(b)(iv);
(vi) a limited liability company of which the
debtor is a member or manager; or
(vii) a relative of a general partner, director,
officer, or person in control of the debtor;
(c) if the debtor is a partnership:
(i) a general partner in the debtor;

25-6-3
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(ii) a relative of a general partner in, a general
partner of, or a person in control of the debtor;
(iii) another partnership in which the debtor is
a general partner;
(iv) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection (7)(c)(iii);
(v) a limited liability company of which the
debtor is a member or manager; or
(vi) a person in control of the debtor;
(d) if the debtor is a limited liability company:
(i) a member or manager of the debtor;
(ii) another limited liability company in which
the debtor is a member or manager;
(iii) a partnership in which the debtor is a
general partner;
(iv) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection (7)(dXiii);
(v) a person in control of the debtor; or
(vi) a relative of a general partner, member,
manager, or person in control of the debtor;
(e) an affiliate, or an insider of an affiliate as if the
affiliate were the debtor; and
(f) a managing agent of the debtor.
(8) "Lien" means a charge against or an interest in
property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an
obligation, and includes a security interest created by
agreement, a judicial lien obtained by legal or equitable
process or proceedings, a common-law lien, or a statutory
lien.
(9) "Person" means an individual, partnership, limited
liability company, corporation, association, organization,
government or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, or any other legal or commercial
entity.
(10) "Property" means anything that may be the subject of ownership.
(11) "Relative" means an individual or an individual
related to a spouse, related by consanguinity within the
third degree as determined by the common law, or a
spouse, and includes an individual in an adoptive relationship within the third degree.
(12) "Transfer" means every mode, direct or indirect,
absolute or conditional, or voluntary or involuntary, of
disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an
asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, and
creation of a lien or other encumbrance.
(13) "Valid lien" means a lien that is effective against
the holder of a judicial lien subsequently obtained by legal
or equitable process or proceedings.
1992
25-6-3. I n s o l v e n c y .
(1) A debtor is insolvent if the sum of the debtor's debts is
greater t h a n all of the debtor's assets at a fair valuation.
($S A debtor who is ^ewerally ivot payiag his debts a s tivey
become due is presumed to be insolvent.

(3) A partnership is insolvent under Subsection (1) if the
sum of the partnership's debts is greater than the aggregate,
at a fair valuation, of all of the partnership's assets and the
sum of the excess of the value of each general partner's
nonpartnership assets over the partner's nonpartnership
debts.
(4) Assets under this section do not include property that
has been transferred, concealed, or removed with intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud creditors or that has been transferred
in a manner making the transfer voidable under this chapter.
(5) Debts under this section do not include an obligation to
the extent it is secured by a valid Hen on property of the debtor
not included as an asset.
1988

25-6*4. Value — Transfer.
(1) Value is given for a transfer or an obligation if, in
exchange for the transfer or obligation, property is transferred

or a# antecedent debt is secured or satisfied. However, value
does not include an unperformed promise made other than in
the ordinary course of the promisor's business to furnish
support to the debtor or another person.
(2) Under Subsection 25-6-5(lXb) and Section 25-6-6, a
person gives a reasonably equivalent value if the person
acquires an interest of the debtor in an asset pursuant to a
regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sale or execution
of a power of sale for the acquisition or disposition of the
interest of the debtor upon default under a mortgage, deed of
trust* or security agreement.
(3) A transfer is made for present value if the exchange
between the debtor and the transferee is intended by them to
be contemporaneous and is in fact substantially contemporaneous.
1988
25-6'5-

F r a u d u l e n t transfer — Claim a r i s i n g before or

after transfer.
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is
fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose
before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was
incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the
obligation:
(a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any
creditor of the debtor; or
<&\ vdth&vkt recelvisug ^ reasonably ^\uHalen&. vaba& v&
exchange for the transfer or obligation; and the debtor:
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets
of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to
the business or transaction; or
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably
should have believed that he would incur, debts
beyond his ability to pay as they became due.
(2) l b determine "actual intent" under Subsection (lXa),
consideration may be given, among other factors, to whether:
(a) the transfer or obligation was to an insider;
(b) the debtor retained possession or control of the
property transferred after the transfer;
(c) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;
(d) before the transfer was made or obligation was
incurred, the debtor had been sued or threatened with
guit;
(e) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's
assets;
(f) the debtor absconded;
(g) the debtor removed or concealed assets;
(h) the value of the consideration received by the
debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset
transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred;
(i) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly
after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred;
(j) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after
a substantial debt was incurred; and
(k) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the
business to a lienor who transferred the assets to an
insider of the debtor.
1988

25-6'6. Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising before
transfer.
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is
fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose before the
transfer was made or the obligation was incurred if:
(a) the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in
exchange for the transfer or obligation; and
(b) the debtor was insolvent at the time or became
insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation.
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(2) A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a
creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made if the
transfer was made to an insider for an antecedent debt, the
debtor was insolvent at the time, and the insider had reasonable cause to believe t h a t the debtor was insolvent.
1989
25-6-7, Transfer — When m a d e .
In this chapter:
( 1 ) A transfer is made:
(a) with respect to an asset that is real property
other t h a n a fixture, but including the interest of a
seller or purchaser under a contract for the sale of the
asset, when the transfer is so far perfected t h a t a
good-faith purchaser of the asset from the debtor
against whom applicable law permits the transfer to
be perfected cannot acquire an interest in the asset
t h a t is superior to the interest of the transferee; and
(b) with respect to an asset that is not real property or t h a t is a fixture, when the transfer is so far
perfected t h a t a creditor on a simple contract cannot
acquire a judicial lien other than under this chapter
t h a t is superior to the interest of the transferee.
(2) If applicable law permits the transfer to be perfected as provided in Subsection (1) and the transfer is not
so perfected before the commencement of an action for
relief under this chapter, the transfer is deemed made
immediately before the commencement of the action.
(3) If applicable law does not permit the transfer to be
perfected as provided in Subsection (1), the transfer is
made when it becomes effective between the debtor and
the transferee.
(4) A transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired
rights in the asset transferred.
(5) An obligation is incurred:
(a) if oral, when it becomes effective between the
parties; or
(b) if evidenced by a writing, when the writing
executed by the obligor is delivered to or for t h e
benefit of the obligee.
1988
25-6-8. R e m e d i e s of creditors.
(1) In an action for relief against a transfer or obligation
under this chapter, a creditor, subject to the limitations in
Section 25-6-9, may obtain:
(a) avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent
necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim;
(b) an attachment or other provisional remedy against
the asset transferred or other property of the transferee in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by the U t a h
Rules of Civil Procedure;
(c) subject to applicable principles of equity and in
accordance with applicable rules of civil procedure:
(i) an injunction against further disposition by the
debtor or a transferee, or both, of the asset t r a n s ferred or of other property;
(ii) appointment of a receiver to take charge of the
asset transferred or of other property of the transferee; or
(iii) any other relief the circumstances may require.
(2) If a creditor has obtained a judgment on a claim against
the debtor, the creditor, if the court orders, may levy execution
on the asset transferred or its proceeds.
1988
25-6-9. Good faith transfer.
(1) A transfer or obligation is not voidable under Subsection
25-6-5(l)(a) against a person who took in good faith and for a
reasonably equivalent value or against any subsequent transferee or obligee.
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(2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the
extent a transfer is voidable in an action by a creditor under
Subsection 25-6-8(1 )(a), the creditor may recover judgment for
the value of the asset transferred, as adjusted under Subsection (3), or the amount necessary to satisfy the creditor's
claim, whichever is less. The judgment may be entered
against:
(a) the first transferee of the asset or the person for
whose benefit the transfer was made; or
(b) any subsequent transferee other than a good faith
transferee who took for value or from any subsequent
transferee.
(3) If the judgment under Subsection (2) is based upon the
value of the asset transferred, the judgment must be for an
amount equal to the value of the asset at the time of the
transfer, subject to an adjustment as equities may require.
(4) Notwithstanding voidability of a transfer or an obligation under this chapter, a good-faith transferee or obligee is
entitled, to the extent of the value given the debtor for the
transfer or obligation, to:
(a) a Uen on or a right to retain any interest in the asset
transferred;
(b) enforcement of any obligation incurred; or
(c) a reduction in the amount of the liability on the
judgment.
(5) A transfer is not voidable under Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b)
or Section 25-6-6 if the transfer results from:
(a) termination of a lease upon default by the debtor
when the termination is pursuant to the lease and applicable law; or
(b) enforcement of a security interest in compliance
with Title 70A, Chapter 9, the Uniform Commercial Code.
(6) A transfer is not voidable under Subsection 25-6-6(2):
(a) to the extent the insider gave new value to or for the
benefit of the debtor after the transfer was made unless
the new value was secured by a valid lien;
(b) if made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the insider; or
(c) if made pursuant to a good-faith effort to rehabilit a t e t h e debtor and the transfer secured present value
given for t h a t purpose as well as an antecedent debt of the
debtor.

1988

25-6-10. Claim for r e l i e f — T i m e limits.
A claim for relief or cause of action regarding a fraudulent
transfer or obligation under this chapter is extinguished
unless action is brought:
(1) under Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), within four years
after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred or, if later, within one year after the transfer or
obligation was or could reasonably have been discovered
by the claimant;
(2) under Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b) or 25-6-6(1), within
four years after the transfer was made or the obligation
was incurred; or
(3) under Subsection 25-6-6(2), within one year after
t h e transfer was made or the obligation was incurred.
1988

25-6-11. Legal principles applicable to chapter.
Unless displaced b)' this chapter, the principles of law and
equity, including merchant law and the law relating to principal and agent, equitable subordination, estoppel, laches,
fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, insolvency, or other validating or invalidating cause, supplement
this chapter's provisions.
1988
25-6-12. C o n s t r u c t i o n of c h a p t e r .
This chapter shall be applied and construed to effectuate its
general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the
subject of this chapter among states enacting it.
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